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Exit, Voice and Loyalty from the Perspective




This article discusses hedge funds activism based on Hirsch-
man’s classic. It is argued that hedge funds do not create
the loyalty concerns underlying the usual short-termism cri-
tique of their activism, because the arbiters of such activism
are typically indexed funds, which cannot choose short-term
exit. Nevertheless, the voice activated by hedge funds can
be excessive for a particular company. Furthermore, this
article claims that the short-termism debate cannot shed
light on the desirability of hedge funds activism. Neither
theory nor empirical evidence can tell whether hedge funds
activism leads to short-termism or long-termism. The real
issue with activism is a conflict of entrepreneurship, namely
a conflict between the opposing views of the activists and
the incumbent management regarding in how long an indi-
vidual company should be profitable. Leaving the choice
between these views to institutional investors is not efficient
for every company at every point in time. Consequently,
this article argues that regulation should enable individual
companies to choose whether to curb hedge funds activism
depending on what is efficient for them. The recent Europe-
an experience reveals that loyalty shares enable such choice,
even in the midstream, operating as dual-class shares in dis-
guise. However, loyalty shares can often be introduced
without institutional investors’ consent. This outcome could
be improved by allowing dual-class recapitalisations, instead
of loyalty shares, but only with a majority of minority vote.
This solution would screen for the companies for which
temporarily curbing activism is efficient, and induce these
companies to negotiate sunset clauses with institutional
investors.
Keywords: Uncertainty, entrepreneurship, agency costs, loy-
alty shares, institutional investors
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1 Introduction
Shareholder activism in publicly held companies is
much in the news, particularly hedge funds activism.1
Activist hedge funds engage the management of an
underperforming listed company in which they have
bought a significant stake. Hedge funds seek to deter-
mine a change in the governance or in the strategy, from
which they will profit by selling their shares at a premi-
um after performance has returned to full potential.
Last year, the U.S. hedge fund Value Act Capital
became the largest shareholder of the UK engineering
company Rolls Royce, seeking to persuade the manage-
ment to restructure the company.2 Engagements by
activist hedge funds have included pharmaceutical U.S.
companies such as DuPont and Allergan.3 Hedge funds
activism has not spared giant corporations, such as
Microsoft and Apple. The phenomenon is not limited to
U.S. or UK companies. Activists have targeted several
companies in continental Europe, such as the Swedish
automotive company Volvo, the German steel company
ThyssenKrupp, the Dutch bank ABN-AMRO, the
French media company Vivendi and the largest Italian
telecom operator, Telecom Italia.4 Activism appears to
1. Shareholder activism can be identified as actions by a shareholder or a
group thereof aimed at bringing about change in a public company
without trying to gain control. See S. Gillan and L.T. Starks, ‘The Evolu-
tion of Shareholder Activism in the United States’, 19 Journal of
Applied Corporate Finance 55 (2007). Only a small subset of hedge
funds pursue activism. Activist hedge funds engage target companies
with a peculiar strategy, described below in the text. This is called
‘entrepreneurial activism’, to distinguish it from more traditional forms
of shareholder activism. See A. Klein and E. Zur, ‘Entrepreneurial Share-
holder Activism: Hedge Funds and Other Private Investors’, 64 Journal
of Finance 187 (2009). Also see infra, text to notes 35-40.
2. See ‘Rolls-Royce Gets Activist Fund Value Act as Biggest Investor’,
Bloomberg Business (31 July 2015). available at: <http:// bloom. bg/
1Qjgm0Q> (last visited 17 June 2016). More recently, Rolls Royce
agreed to reserve a board seat for Value Act conditional on a Value Act
promising to keep ownership within a certain range and not seek the
break-up of the company. See ‘Rolls-Royce Agrees Value Act Board
Deal’, Financial Times, 2 March 2016, available at: <http:// on. ft. com/
1oXZXpu> (last visited 17 June 2016).
3. See J.C. Coffee, Jr., ‘Lessons of DuPont: Corporate Governance for
Dummies’, CLS Blue Sky Blog (2015), available at: <http:// clsbluesky.
law. columbia. edu/ 2015/ 06/ 01/ the -lessons -of -dupont -corporate -
governance -for -dummies/> (last visited 17 June 2016).
4. See The New Barbarians – Shareholder Activists Have Europe in Their
Sights, in Skadden’s 2014 Insights – Global M&A, available at: <www.
skadden. com/ insights/ new -barbarians -shareholder -activists -have -
europe -their -sights> (last visited 17 June 2016).
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have an impact also in concentrated ownership struc-
tures, where one or more dominant shareholders are in
control.5 Even in dispersed ownership structures, hedge
funds activists do not always manage to obtain from
management all they want.6 Because hedge fund acti-
vists have become one of the most powerful influencers
of corporate governance worldwide, they have attracted
significant attention from policymakers who, in most
cases, are concerned with how to curb such power.
This article aims to discuss the policy response to hedge
funds activism from a law and economics perspective.
The analysis is based on a seminal study of feedback
mechanisms in large organisations, ranging from gov-
ernments to corporations: Albert Hirschman’s book,
Exit, Voice and Loyalty.7 The problem Hirschman tried
to address in his 1970 book is rather similar to activist
hedge funds’ concern: How to bring a company’s per-
formance back to full potential. Hirschman’s theory can
help frame the question whether and under what condi-
tions activism is desirable, which in turn can inform pol-
icymaking in this field.
In Hirschman’s terms, activism is the quintessence of
voice. Voice of shareholders serves the important func-
tion of alerting the management about the decline of a
specific company.8 Voice is alternative to exit. Exit of
shareholders also alerts the management about a compa-
ny’s decline, but more indirectly, through the price
mechanism.9 As a result, exit may postpone the realisa-
tion of decline until it is too late to do something about
it. Takeovers are a good illustration of how the exit
mechanism impacts corporate governance. Because
takeovers are expensive, they operate as a feedback
mechanism only in cases of severe underperformance.10
One important aspect of Hirschman’s framework is loy-
alty.11 The ability of shareholders to exit through liquid
stock markets normally disincentivises them from exer-
cising voice. This is not the case if there is loyalty to a
given company. Making exit more expensive, loyalty
commits shareholders to voice. Loyalty has become very
popular in today’s policy debate, but not quite in the
5. See e.g. T. Poulsen, T. Strand & S. Thomsen, ‘Voting Power and Share-
holder Activism: A Study of Swedish Shareholder Meeting’, 18 Corpo-
rate Governance: An International Review 329 (2010) on Sweden; W.
Bessler, W. Drobetz & J. Holler, ‘The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism in
Germany’, 21 European Financial Management 106 (2013) on Germa-
ny; and M. Belcredi and L. Enriques, ‘Institutional Investor Activism in a
Context of Concentrated Ownership and High Private Benefits of Con-
trol: The Case of Italy’, in J.G. Hill and R.S. Thomas (eds.), Research
Handbook on Shareholder Power (2015) 383.
6. See M. Becht et al., ‘The Returns to Hedge Fund Activism: An Interna-
tional Study’, European Corporate Governance Institute, Finance Work-
ing Paper No. 402/2014 (2016), (revision 27 May 2016), reporting an
average 53% success rate on a global level (61% in the USA; 50% in
Europe; 21% in Asia). Success is defined as achievement of at least one
of the outcomes sought for in the campaign.
7. A.O. Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in
Firms, Organizations, and States (1970).
8. Ibid., at 30.
9. Ibid., at 22-24.
10. P. Bolton, M. Becht & A. Röell, ‘Corporate Law and Governance’, in
A.M. Polinsky and S. Shavell (eds.), Handbook of Law and Economics
(2007), at 879-880.
11. Hirschman, above n. 7, at 77-19.
same sense as Hirschman’s. While to Hirschman loyalty
meant a commitment device for shareholders to use
voice instead of exiting an organisation they are dissatis-
fied with, for policymakers, loyalty distinguishes ‘good’
voice from ‘bad’ voice in corporate governance – hedge
funds activism being an illustration of the latter.12
At first sight, concerns with shareholder voice are puz-
zling. Vocal shareholders, such as activist hedge funds,
are doing other investors a favour. In dispersed owner-
ship structures, hedge funds foster managerial accounta-
bility to investors, particularly when managers perform
poorly. Similarly, in concentrated ownership structures,
hedge funds are guarding minority shareholders against
outright expropriation. In sum, the very presence of
hedge funds activism reduces the average cost of capital
for companies, by way of improving investor protection.13
The issue with hedge funds, however, is subtler. Hedge
funds are blamed for injecting short-termism in corpo-
rate governance. Short-termism is a popular way to
characterise stock market imperfection: Stock markets
overweigh the short-term income of a company at the
expense of its long-term profitability.14 If financial mar-
kets were informationally efficient, there could be no
conflict between short-term and long-term value maxi-
misation. Although whether and to what extent stock
markets are informationally efficient remains controver-
sial, this article assumes that there may be indeed a con-
flict between the short term and the long term. Particu-
larly, the stock market price may fail to incorporate
future profit opportunities that are far into the future
and highly uncertain. Still, this limitation of stock mar-
ket prices tells us nothing about the desirability of hedge
fund activism. The real question is whether, given the
possibility that stock markets are short-termist, hedge
12. Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic have taken initiatives to pro-
mote long-term, loyal shareholding. Invariably, these initiatives consist
in creating a disparity (in terms of voting power, cash flow rights or tax-
es) between long-term and short-term shareholders. See Aspen Insti-
tute, ‘Overcoming Short-Termism: A Call for a More Responsible
Approach to Investment and Business Management’ (2009), available
at: <www. aspeninstitute. org/ sites/ default/ files/ content/ docs/ pubs/
overcome_ short_ state0909_ 0. pdf> (last visited 17 June 2016); J. Kay,
‘The Kay Review of UK Equity Markets and Long-Term Decision Mak-
ing (Final Report)’ (July 2012), available at: <www. bis. gov. uk/ assets/
biscore/ business -law/ docs/ k/ 12 -631 -kay -review -of -equity -markets -
interim -report> (last visited 17 June 2016); ‘Brussels Aims to Reward
Investor Loyalty’, Financial Times (23 January 2013), available at:
<http:// on. ft. com/ WWciED> (last visited 17 June 2016); Report by the
EU Parliament Committee on Legal Affairs on the proposal for a Direc-
tive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive
2007/36/EC as regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder
engagement and Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of
the corporate governance statement (12 May 2015), available at:
<www. europarl. europa. eu/ sides/ getDoc. do ?type= REPORT& mode=
XML& reference= A8 -2015 -0158& language= EN> (last visited 17 June
2016) (hereinafter Cofferati Report 2015).
13. R. La Porta et al., ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’, 52 Journal
of Finance 1131 (1997).
14. See C.A. Hill and B. McDonnel, ‘Short and Long Term Investors (and
Other Stakeholders Too): Must (and Do) Their Interests Conflict?’, in
C.A. Hill and S.D. Solomon (eds.), Research Handbook on Mergers and
Acquisitions (2016) [forthcoming], available at: <http:// ssrn. com/
abstract= 2699324> (last visited 17 June 2016) for an informal illustra-
tion.
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funds activism undermines corporate governance by
steering managers towards value-destroying choices.15
The scepticism of policymakers towards hedge funds
activism is based on the assumption that short-termism
is unambiguously value-destroying. Because hedge
funds are guided by the stock market, where they realise
the gains from activism, hedge funds must be short-
termist too and induce management to sacrifice long-
term shareholder value for short-term performance.
Long term-shareholding could overcome this problem.
So long as long-term shareholders face high costs of
exit, they are to be considered loyal in Hirschman’s
sense. In exercising voice, long-term shareholders
should have the incentives to care for the company’s
well-being in the long run. Although hedge funds are
key to activate the voice of long-term investors,16 several
policy measures have been proposed to curb hedge
funds activism aiming to encourage long-term share-
holdings instead. A group of these proposals aim to
reduce the impact of hedge funds through disclosure
obligations, which would undermine hedge funds’ busi-
ness model while being neutral to longer-term share-
holdings.17 Another group of proposals aim at tilting the
balance of powers towards more loyal shareholders, or at
offering them financial incentives, by way of so-called
loyalty shares.18
Albeit popular among policymakers, the short-termism
argument is regarded with scepticism by a majority of
commentators, who, accordingly, oppose the curbs of
hedge funds activism and the favour towards loyal
shareholders.19 This is because the empirical evidence
does not support the more radical formulation of the
short-termism claim, namely that activism induces man-
agers to go for the ‘quick buck’ and destroy long-term
shareholder value.20 On average, hedge funds activism
brings about a substantial short-term increase in share-
holder value, which is not reversed in the aftermath of
the engagement. Although the empirical evidence also
supports the view that managers occasionally engage in
long-term value destruction to cater to short-term
15. M.J. Roe, ‘Corporate Short-Termism – in the Boardroom and in the
Courtroom’, 68 Business Lawyer 977 (2013), at 985.
16. See R.J. Gilson and J.N. Gordon, ‘The Agency Costs of Agency Capital-
ism: Activist Investors and Revaluation of Governance Rights’, 113
Columbia Law Review 863 (2013). One interesting implication of this
point is that, however short-termist hedge funds are, short-termism
would not occur in corporate governance if investors with a long-term
horizon were always decisive on an activist’s campaign. As we will see
infra, text to notes 116-118, the reality is more nuanced than this.
17. See A.O. Emmerich et al., ‘Fair Markets and Fair Disclosure: Some
Thoughts on the Law and Economics of Blockholder Disclosure, and the
Use and Abuse of Shareholder Power’, 3 Harvard Business Law Review
135 (2013).
18. See J. Fox and J.W. Lorsch, ‘What Good Are Shareholders?’ 90 Harvard
Business Review 48 (2012); P. Bolton and F. Samama, ‘Loyalty-Shares:
Rewarding Long-term Investors’, 25 Journal of Applied Corporate
Finance 86 (2013); Cofferati Report (2015), above n. 12.
19. L.A. Bebchuk, A. Brav & W. Jiang, ‘The Long Term Effects of Hedge
Fund Activism’, 113 Columbia Law Review 1637 (2015).
20. See infra text to notes 71-75.
investors’ sentiment,21 hedge funds activism seems not
to be directly responsible for this. What the empirical
evidence does not and cannot tell us, however, is wheth-
er the presence of hedge funds activism is desirable for
corporate governance in general.
In this article, I will argue that the short-termism debate
does not shed much light on this crucial question. I will
discuss several reasons. For one, short-term and long-
term horizons are ill-defined. Any action can be charac-
terised as short-term depending on the definition of the
long term. This is not very helpful for policy purposes.
Second, even if we identified a conventional definition
of short term as opposed to the long term, which hori-
zon is preferable for the purpose of managing a compa-
ny would not be obvious.22 What is the ‘right term’ to
create value is a difficult question that may be impossi-
ble to answer with precision. Efficiency may require
managing for the short term, for instance because,
according to Hirschman’s framework, in highly compet-
itive markets feedback must be immediate in order to
allow for timely ‘recuperation’ from underperformance.
In this case, the problem may rather be long-termism
than short-termism.23 However, Hirschman was very
clear that what is an efficient recuperation mechanism
for a firm may be inefficient for another, and this cir-
cumstance is susceptible to change over time.24 There-
fore, efficiency may require as well managing for the
long term, at least to the extent that the definition of
long term allows for feedback to intervene timely. In
this case, concerns for short-termism may be warranted.
The conflict between the short-term and the long-term
view of profit maximisation varies with context and, as
such, is impossible to resolve empirically. Even if one
could identify the ‘right term’ with precision, that
would vary with the individual company and over time.
Because companies are not alike and are dynamic, the
positive stock returns associated with the shortening of
horizons commanded by hedge fund activism says noth-
ing about the efficiency of the engagement. To claim
that activism is value-enhancing one would need to
compare the target’s performance not with a market
index, as in a typical event study, but rather with a
counterfactual, similar firm that has not capitulated to
activism and is insensitive to its threat.25 The feasibility
21. B.J. Bushee, ‘The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D
Investment Behavior’, 73 Accounting Review 19 (1998); and B.J. Bush-
ee, ‘Do Institutional Investors Prefer Near-Term Earnings over Long-Run
Value’, 18 Contemporary Accounting Research 207 (2001).
22. See an extensive discussion of this point in J.M. Fried, ‘The Uneasy Case
for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders’, Yale Law Journal 1554 (2014).
23. For empirical evidence that firms more exposed to competition benefit
from the influence of short-term investors, See M. Giannetti and X. Yu,
‘The Corporate Finance Benefits of Short Horizon Investors’, European
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) – Finance Working Paper No.
467/2016 (2016), available at <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2723357>
(last visited 21 June 2016).
24. Hirschman, above n. 7, at 124.
25. See V.A. Atanasov and B.S. Black, ‘Shock-Based Causal Inference in
Corporate Finance Research’, ECGI-Finance Working Paper No. 448
(2015), available at <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 1718555> (last visited
21 June 2016); J.D. Angrist and J-F. Pischke, Mostly Harmless Econo-
metrics: An Empiricist’s Companion (2012).
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of such research design is complicated by the fact that
companies that are not engaged, but could be, react in
anticipation of engagement and thus are not good as
counterfactual.26 Although recent studies of activism
have made significant progress in coping with these cau-
sality issues,27 the fact remains that firms that are (or
can be) targeted by activism are radically different from
those that are not (and cannot be). Consequently, the
activists’ views on, for instance, innovation cannot be
compared with those of companies that are not suscepti-
ble to targeting by hedge funds. Most likely, their dif-
ferent performance over the same horizon – whether
long or short – will be a reflection of the different kinds
of innovation they engage in.
The debate on the right horizon for managing a listed
company confounds the effect – short-termism – with
the cause – uncertainty. Building on a long-standing
tradition of students of uncertainty,28 this article claims
that the choice of the horizon to maximise profits
belongs to the entrepreneur because he or she is the one
to make choices under uncertainty. Consequently, this
article claims that the problem of hedge fund activism is
to be framed as a conflict of entrepreneurship between
the activist and the incumbent management. In corpo-
rate governance, entrepreneurship is a bet on forthcom-
ing change, which will be profitable if the change hap-
pens as predicted and unprofitable otherwise.29 The size
of the bet shows the entrepreneur’s commitment to the
project. This, in turn, affects the funds that can be
raised from outside investors.30 Investors are not antici-
pating the change the entrepreneur is betting on, which
is a precondition for the change to be profitable if it
occurs. Investors leave corporate control with the man-
agement so long as they trust them to be good entrepre-
26. M. Barzuza and E.L. Talley, ‘Short-Termism and Long-Termism’,
Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 526 (2016), argue,
in a game-theoretic fashion, that a substantial part of managerial short-
termism may occur ‘off the equilibrium path’, namely under the rational
expectation of engagement by hedge funds. The effect of the threat of
engagement is hard to capture empirically.
27. See e.g. A. Brav et al., ‘Shareholder Power and Corporate Innovation:
Evidence from Hedge Fund Activism’, Kelley School of Business
Research Paper 2014-05 (2014), analysing the impact of hedge funds
activism on innovation with propensity score matching, and finding that
while activism reduces innovation input, it does not diminish innovation
output. See also K.J.M. Cremers et al., ‘Hedge Fund Activism and Long-
Term Firm Value’ (2016), available at <http:// ssrn. com/ abstract=
2693231> (last visited 21 June 2016). Based on a matched sample of
companies not engaged by hedge funds, they find that companies that
are engaged forego some long-term value creation. However, see infra,
note 78 and accompanying text.
28. Uncertainty has been studied extensively by J.M. Keynes, The General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936), (reprinted BN Pub-
lishing 2008), and F.H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921).
According to Knight’s influential distinction, uncertainty differs from risk
because it cannot be assigned a probability; entrepreneurs typically
make choice under uncertainty as opposed to the risky choices of other
market players. Similarly, Keynes attributes to uncertainty a prominent
role in forming long-term expectations, particularly of the entrepreneur
as opposed to financiers. For both Keynes and Knight, entrepreneurship
is the response to unquantifiable uncertainty.
29. A.M. Pacces, Rethinking Corporate Governance: The Law and Econom-
ics of Control Powers (2012), at 71-74.
30. A.M. Pacces, ‘Control Matters: Law and Economics of Private Benefits
of Control’, ECGI-Law Working Paper Series No. 131 (2009).
neurs. When this is no longer the case, investors would
rather hand control over to another entrepreneur, by
exiting and letting somebody else take over or by direct-
ly raising their voice and voting for a new management.
From this perspective, hedge funds activism is a form of
entrepreneurship, comparable to hostile takeovers.31
Hedge funds aim to change the strategy, the manage-
ment or the governance of a target company and profit
from the unanticipated market gains from such changes.
In so doing, hedge funds get in conflict with the manag-
ers or the dominant shareholders who control the target
company. These people may oppose the activist’s
demands because they are entrepreneurs too and genu-
inely believe they have a superior view about the compa-
ny’s strategy. However, they may also resist activism
because they derive private benefits from running the
company below its potential. Whether the incumbent
management’s opposition to activism stems from vision
or extraction of private benefits of control, let alone
whether the management is right or wrong, is hard to
say when the conflict occurs. However, the conflict is
not really about whether a company should be managed
for the short term or the long term. It is rather a conflict
between two views of entrepreneurship, namely about
how the company should look like in the future, includ-
ing the scenario in which managers benefit from run-
ning it inefficiently. The real policy issue is which view
should prevail and whether the law should do anything
to help companies to make the right choice.
Extending the approach developed by Professors Enri-
ques, Gilson and myself for takeover regulation,32 this
article argues that individual companies should decide
‘who decides’ when there is a conflict of views between
an activist investor and the incumbent management or
controlling shareholder. In the remainder of this article,
I will articulate this claim as follows. In Section 2, I will
start by reviewing theory and empirical evidence about
hedge funds activism. As illustrated by Professors Gil-
son and Gordon,33 support by the institutional owners is
the key to activism’s success. In view of this insight, the
question is whether the loyal owners – namely the
investors that cannot exit strategically – can be trusted
to screen hedge funds activism. While optimising indi-
vidual companies’ exposure to exit and voice remains
crucial for efficiency, the desirability of loyalty is today
more nuanced than in the world of dispersed individual
owners Hirschman was living in. The real issue about
shareholder activism is not whether it is long-term or
short-term, but whether a company should commit to
insiders’ or outsiders’ entrepreneurship. In Section 4, I
will argue that none of the main regulatory proposals to
31. Klein and Zur, above n. 1, at 187. Note, however, the difference
between activist hedge funds, which aim to change the company’s
operation without taking over control, and hostile bidders, which, in
contrast, seek immediately to purchase control. See H.G. Manne,
‘Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control’, 73 Journal of Political
Economy 110 (1965).
32. L. Enriques, R.J. Gilson & A.M. Pacces, ‘The Case for an Unbiased Take-
over Law (with an Application to the European Union)’, 4 Harvard Busi-
ness Law Review 85 (2014).
33. Gilson and Gordon, above n. 16.
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screen for efficient shareholder activism – enhanced dis-
closure obligations and the so-called loyalty shares –
help companies to make that choice. On the contrary, a
‘sticky’ one-share-one-vote (1S1V) default34 would ena-
ble individual companies to select the efficient regime
and to alter it when it becomes inefficient down the
road. Section 5 concludes.
2 Entrepreneurial Shareholder
Activism
Shareholder activism is not new. Activists have always
been prompting corporate managers to act on some
issue, even unrelated to the conduct of the company’s
business. Particularly in the United States, activists
have been able to add items on the agenda of the general
meeting at the company’s expense, by filing a so-called
shareholder proposal.35 However, such traditional acti-
vism has not been very effective, and before the advent
of hedge funds activism, investors seemed unable to
achieve concrete outcomes through this channel.36
Despite the regulatory differences, a similar conclusion
could be made about comparable channels for tradition-
al activism in Europe.37
Hedge funds activism is different.38 It does not simply
aim to alert management on some issue by triggering a
shareholder vote on it. It aims to achieve a change in the
way the company is managed. Such change can be –
although not necessarily is – quite radical, such as the
departure of the CEO or some other executives, if not
the restructuring of the company. Likewise, activist
hedge funds may seek to stop a change wanted by the
management, for instance an acquisition. For this rea-
son, hedge funds activism is called ‘entrepreneurial acti-
vism.’ This is how I will refer to it in the remainder of
the article. Differently from traditional activism, the
mark of entrepreneurial activism’s success is not so
much the level of shareholder support at the general
meeting, but whether the desired change(s) happens or
not.39 The business model of activist hedge funds
34. For a “Theory of Sticky Defaults” (subsequently renamed “Theory of
Altering Rules”), see I. Ayres, ‘Regulating Opt-Out: An Economic Theo-
ry of Altering Rules’, 121 Yale Law Journal 2032 (2011).
35. Gillan and Starks, above n. 1, at 55.
36. See D. Yermack, ‘Shareholder Voting and Corporate Governance’, 2
Annual Review of Financial Economics 103 (2010). The situation has
changed more recently, though, particularly in the United States with
regard to the removal of staggered boards. See J.C. Coates IV, ‘Thirty
Years of Evolution in the Roles of Institutional Investors in Corporate
Governance’, in J.G. Hill and R.S. Thomas (eds.), Research Handbook
on Shareholder Power 76 (2015).
37. See e.g. A. de Jong, G.M.H. Mertens & P.G.J. Roosenboom, ‘Sharehold-
ers’ Voting at General meetings: Evidence from the Netherlands’, 10
Journal of Management & Governance 353 (2006).
38. See F. Partnoy, ‘U.S. Hedge Fund Activism’, in J.G. Hill and R.S. Thomas
(eds.), Research Handbook on Shareholder Power 99 (2015), and earli-
er, J. Macey, Corporate Governance: Promises Kept, Promises Broken
(2008), at 244-51, for an illustration of the difference between hedge
funds activism and traditional forms of shareholder activism.
39. Becht et al., above n. 6.
explains why this is so. Differently from other institu-
tional investors, hedge funds managers charge a per-
formance fee in addition to a percentage of the asset
under management.40 This aligns their incentives with
investors having a relatively high appetite for risk.
Hedge funds profit from investing in stock that they can
buy, hold and resell at a higher price. The purpose of
entrepreneurial activists’ engagement with the manage-
ment of the target company is to achieve meanwhile a
change that will boost the stock price.
Two factors are key for the success of entrepreneurial
activism. First, the hedge fund needs to be able to buy
the bulk of its stake in the company while the stock mar-
ket does not anticipate the engagement. The moment
the engagement is revealed, investors will anticipate
gains and, discounting those for the probability that the
engagement fails, the stock price will rise. Second, the
activist needs to be able to persuade the management to
implement the desired changes. To increase its leverage
with the management, the activist can use several tech-
niques, ranging from news campaigns to threatening a
lawsuit, but the last resort is to wage a proxy context.
Reached that point, the success of the engagement will
depend on whether the activist has managed to attract
sufficient support from other shareholders to get a
favourable vote.
The support by institutional investors is crucial for suc-
cessful engagement. The typical hedge fund stake in the
target company is substantial, but not nearly a control-
ling one.41 As a result, activists must persuade institu-
tional investors to vote for them. By the same token,
engagement may succeed based on the sheer threat of
winning a contested vote.42 The likelihood of winning
the battle can be estimated while the investing public is
still in the dark about the engagement. From the
moment the hedge funds formulate their demands to
the management, both parties start to speak with the
largest institutional investors. Management will give in
to the activists’ demands when it is clear they are going
to lose the vote, whereas hedge funds will withdraw
from engagement when they realise that not enough
institutional investors will vote for them. Most of the
time the parties will settle somewhere in the middle.
The fight becomes public only when no agreement can
be reached. Consequently, a substantial portion of
hedge funds engagement takes place behind closed
doors, which, as I will explain shortly, has important
consequences for empirical analyses.
As explained by Professors Gilson and Gordon, the tre-
mendous influence activists have gained in corporate
governance lately depends mainly on the re-concentra-
40. Gilson and Gordon, above n. 16.
41. For their global sample, Becht et al., above n. 6, report an average stake
of 11%. For the United States, other studies (Gilson and Gordon, above
n. 16, at 899); N. Gantchev, ‘The Costs of Shareholder Activism: Evi-
dence from a Sequential Decision Model’, 107 Journal of Financial Eco-
nomics 610 (2013), at 621, report that activist investors hold 8% on
average.
42. M. Becht et al., ‘Hedge Fund Activism in Europe: Does Privacy Mat-
ter?’, in J.G. Hill and R.S. Thomas (eds.), Research Handbook on Share-
holder Power 116 (2015).
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tion of ownership that has occurred in the past few dec-
ades.43 In the world Hirschman was living in, voice by
activists was not very promising because the dispersed
individual stockholders of a Berle-Means Corporation
would not bother to vote, particularly against the man-
agement of the company they decided to invest in.44
However, even in the United States, the Berle-Means
Corporation does no longer exist. Gilson and Gordon
report that, in 2009, institutional investors held on aver-
age 73% of the equity of the thousand largest U.S. cor-
porations.45 Unsurprisingly, the voting power of institu-
tional investors is also quite concentrated: the represen-
tatives of institutions jointly holding control of a typical
U.S. company would fit around a boardroom table.46 A
recent study by the OECD provides similar results for
the United Kingdom.47 Moreover, concentration of
non-controlling ownership is a documented phenomen-
on also in countries where dominant shareholders are
frequent, such as Sweden and the Netherlands.48
If roughly two dozen institutional investors hold enough
votes in the typical management-controlled company to
be decisive, and a substantial portion of the voting rights
also in companies with dominant shareholders, one
would expect institutional investors, rather than hedge
funds activists, to exercise voice. The reason why this
has not happened is agency costs.49 Institutional invest-
ors manage other people’s money and do so with a busi-
ness model that disincentivises monitoring of individual
companies. Although institutional investors are very dif-
ferent from each other, for reasons of law, profiling and
investment culture, they all hold a diversified portfolio
of stock. Institutional investors charge flat fees based on
assets under management, and the latter mainly depends
on the institution’s ability to attract funds from the
competitors – that is, relative performance. Relative
performance is unaffected by improving the returns of a
particular portfolio company, because the competitors
will free ride on that, while it is adversely affected by the
cost of becoming informed about underperforming
companies to engage with. Therefore, institutional
investors are ‘rationally reticent’.50 They are not proac-
tive in influencing corporate management, but they are
responsive to other, entrepreneurial, actors who bring
the case for engagement to their attention.
According to Gilson and Gordon, the activists’ teaming
up with institutional investors is beneficial for corporate
governance. On the one hand, activists lower the agency
costs of institutional ownership. On the other hand,
43. Gilson and Gordon, above n. 16, at 874.
44. Hirschman, above n. 7, at 46.
45. Gilson and Gordon, above n. 16, at 874.
46. Ibid., at 875.
47. M. Isaksson and S. Celik, ‘Who Cares: Corporate Governance in
Today’s Equity Markets’, 8 OECD Corporate Governance Working
Papers (2013).
48. P. Lekvall (ed.), The Nordic Corporate Governance Model (Stockholm:
SNS Forlag 2015) and A. de Jong et al., ‘Changing National Business
Systems: Corporate Governance and Financing in the Netherlands,
1945-2005’, 84 Business History Review 773 (2010).
49. Gilson and Gordon, above n. 16, at 889-95.
50. Ibid., at 895.
institutional investors screen activists’ proposals and
likely sanction only those that increase shareholder val-
ue. Empirical evidence supports the conclusion that
activists give other shareholders what they want. Several
studies document the association of shareholder acti-
vism with an average increase in shareholder value.51
Importantly, this increase stems from the activists’
achieving outcomes of sort, namely garnering broad
support from institutional investors. Moreover, the
increase is larger for outcomes more related to strategic
change than for others.52
Reducing agency costs undoubtedly improves the effi-
ciency of corporate governance, which in this article is
defined as maximisation of shareholder value.53 Howev-
er, this approach does not demonstrate that hedge fund
activism is always value-increasing. Several objections,
concerning the effectiveness of the screening by institu-
tional investors and the short-termism of the activists’
demands, have been raised.54 In the remainder of this
section, I will show that while the first set of objections
appears to be overstated, the second claim has some
merit, albeit in a different way than normally under-
stood. Particularly, the empirical evidence can only
reject the most trivial version of the short-termism
claim, namely that the stock market gains brought about
by the activist’s engagement are subsequently reversed.
However, empirical analyses cannot answer the more
fundamental question of whether hedge funds activism
increases (or decreases) value across the board.
It is sometimes argued that institutional investors do not
really exercise judgment, but rather blindly follow the
recommendations of proxy advisors, notably including
global market leaders such as Institutional Shareholders
Services (ISS) and Glass-Lewis.55 The argument echoes
51. Klein and Zur, above n. 1; A. Brav, J. Wei, F. Partnoy & R. Thomas,
‘Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance’,
63 Journal of Finance 1729 (2008); C.P. Clifford, ‘Value Creation or
Destruction? Hedge Funds as Shareholder Activists’, 14 Journal of Cor-
porate Finance 323 (2008).
52. Becht et al., above n. 6.
53. There are two reasons to choose shareholder value as a welfare criterion
for the purposes of this article. First, this article deals with shareholder
feedback in corporate governance. Although Hirschman’s framework
applies to feedback from other stakeholders, hedge funds activism and
the institutional investors’ support that makes it viable are undoubtedly
shareholders’ reactions to a firm’s governance. Second, this article con-
tends that corporate governance is not directly responsible for the
externalities generated by corporate enterprises (with the exception of
entrepreneurship). See infra, text to notes 121-122. Therefore, the
judgment on the desirability of hedge funds activism is independent of
the effects on stakeholders different from shareholders. This approach
allows using a simple Kaldor–Hicks test to determine whether hedge
funds activism is efficient – namely whether shareholders are net better
off. This is in line with mainstream finance literature on the impact of
hedge funds activism. For a similar approach, albeit applied to take-
overs, see Enriques and others, above n. 32, at 85.
54. See especially J.C. Coffee, Jr. and D. Palia, ‘The Wolf at the Door: The
Impact of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Governance’, 1 Annals of
Corporate Governance 1 (2016). But sceptics include, among others,
Bolton and Samama, above n. 18, and M. Lipton, Important Questions
about Activist Hedge Funds, available at: <http:// corpgov. law. harvard.
edu/ 2013/ 03/ 09/ important -questions -about -activist -hedge -funds/>
(last visited 21 June 2016).
55. Coffee and Palia, above n. 54.
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policymakers’ scepticism about proxy advisors.56 It has a
theoretical basis. Because the institutional investors’
business model does not encourage monitoring individ-
ual companies, institutions used to be passive about vot-
ing. Recently, however, particularly U.S. legislation has
compelled major categories of investors – mutual funds
and pension funds – to disclose their voting policies.57
Hence, to avoid embarrassment, institutional investors
purchase professional advice from proxy advisors and,
arguably, mechanically follow their advice. Because the
quality of this advice is questionable,58 institutional
investors that follow it cannot be trusted to screen hedge
funds activism effectively. However, the influence of
proxy advisors on institutional investors may be oversta-
ted.
Virtually all mutual funds, which are the largest U.S.
corporate owners taken together, subscribe to one or
more proxy advisors, including ISS. However, only
25% of mutual funds always vote in line with the proxy
advice, and, on an asset-weighted basis, reliance on
management’s advice is higher than reliance on ISS.59
Reliance varies greatly among institutional investors
because they differ considerably too, especially in their
size, investment strategies and horizons. Not only do
the largest U.S. asset managers, which have the largest
dollar-value stakes, vote independently from ISS60; in
some circumstances they are also more influential.61
Even indexed funds, which passively track market indi-
ces, vote actively on a number of issues.62 Finally,
because proxy advisors cater to their customers’ tastes
and expectations, it is ultimately impossible to deter-
mine precisely how much advisors influence asset man-
agers or are influenced by them.63 According to one
study, an ISS advice against the management shifts at
most 10% of votes in U.S. uncontested elections.64
Although there are no studies documenting the direct
influence of ISS on activists’ campaigns, such influence
seems to be not as overwhelming as the standard narra-
tive suggests.
56. Communication from the European Commission to the European Parlia-
ment, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and
the Committee of the Regions, Action Plan: European company law and
corporate governance – a modern legal framework for more engaged
shareholders and sustainable companies, COM/2012/0740, 12 Decem-
ber 2012.
57. E.B. Rock, ‘Institutional Investors in Corporate Governance’ (21 July
2015). Forthcoming in Oxford Handbook on Corporate Law and Gov-
ernance, University of Pennsylvania, Institute of Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 14-37 (2015), at 13-14.
58. See R.M. Daines et al., ‘Rating the Ratings: How Good Are Commercial
Governance Ratings?’, 98 Journal of Financial Economics 439 (2010).
59. P. Iliev and M. Lowry, ‘Are Mutual Funds Active Voters?’, 28 Review of
Financial Studies 446 (2015), at 453.
60. Ibid., at 455.
61. S. Choi et al., ‘Who Calls the Shots: How Mutual Funds Vote on Direc-
tor Elections’, 3 Harvard Business Law Review 35 (2013).
62. I. Appel, T. Gormley & D.B. Keim, ‘Passive Investors, Not Passive Own-
ers’, 121 Journal of Financial Economics 111 (2016).
63. J. McCahery, Z. Sautner & L. Starks, ‘Behind the Scenes: The Corporate
Governance Preferences of Institutional Investors’, Journal of Finance
(2016) [forthcoming], available at: <doi: 10. 1111/ jofi. 12393>.
64. S.J. Choi, J. Fisch & M. Kahan, ‘The Power of Proxy Advisors: Myth or
Reality?’, 59 Emory Law Journal 869 (2010).
Activist hedge funds could still avoid a thorough scruti-
ny by institutional investors if they used a strategy that
made them win almost with certainty. This is a second
powerful objection to hedge funds activism and is based
on the so-called “wolf pack” strategy.65 A wolf pack is a
coalition of hedge funds aimed at maximising the impact
of engagement. In the U.S., activists have to disclose
their intentions within 10 days of crossing a 5% owner-
ship threshold. In that time window, hedge funds can
profitably increase their ownership, but they do not
usually go above 10%. To improve the odds of the
engagement, one hedge fund could ‘tip’ other hedge
funds. Or, perhaps more plausibly given the money at
stake, other hedge funds may independently decide to
jump on the bandwagon and buy stock. In any event,
because individual ownership remains below 10% and
hedge funds are not collectively seeking control, wolf
packs are immune from allegations of insider trading
and of acting in concert for purposes of European take-
over regulation.
Wolf packs often operate below the radar, which makes
it difficult to estimate their incidence and impact empir-
ically. Still, according to a recent international study,
wolf packs account for about 22% of the overt engage-
ments, increase the success rate (defined as achieving
outcomes) from about 46% to 78% and are more profit-
able than individual engagements.66 Based on this and
other evidence, Professors Coffee and Palia have argued
that wolf packs are a nearly riskless strategy for hedge
funds to make money.67 If the wolf pack puts together
about one-third of the votes, as for instance in the
Sotheby’s case,68 they need to get on board another
7%-10% to win. This is about as much as, on average,
depends on the recommendation of proxy advisors. This
argument suggests that wolf packs will tend to engage
corporate management also when it is not efficient to do
so.
The impact of wolf packs seems to be overestimated for
a number of reasons. First, in more than one-fifth of the
wolf packs that could be identified in the aforemen-
tioned study, hedge funds have failed to achieve out-
comes – hence they have lost money. Second, although
wolf pack members increase the success rate by buying
from dissatisfied investors, whether the remaining
investors are likely to follow ISS or to vote actively is a
matter of speculation. Actually, the presence of large
investors in the ownership of engaged companies, as in
the Sotheby’s case, suggests that asset managers who
exercise judgment may still be the decisive
shareholders.69 Third, and most important, 78% of the
overt engagements mapped internationally are not wolf
65. Coffee and Palia, above n. 54.
66. Becht et al., above n. 6.
67. Coffee and Palia, above n. 54, at 29.
68. Ibid., at 31-32.
69. R.J. Gilson and J.N. Gordon, ‘The Sotheby’s Poison Pill Case: The Plate
Tectonics of Delaware Corporate Governance’ CLS Blue Sky Blog, avail-
able at: <http:// clsbluesky. law. columbia. edu/ 2014/ 05/ 15/ the -sothebys
-poison -pill -case -the -plate -tectonics -of -delaware -corporate -
governance/> (last visited 21 June 2016).
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packs. There is obviously self-selection here. Hedge
funds choose their battles. They decide to join and form
a wolf pack only when success is more likely. Likewise,
the leading hedge fund, who is getting the lion’s share of
the wolf pack gains, bears two sorts of risk: first, the risk
that others will not join; second, conditional on the pre-
vious event, a higher risk of losing the engagement.
Engagements without outcomes, with or without wolf
packs, deliver insignificant to negative shareholder
returns, but still they happen, revealing that hedge fund
activism is not risk-free.70
The third and most recurrent objection to hedge funds
activism is short-termism. Because hedge funds profit
from targeting underperforming companies, changing
or influencing their management, and reselling the stock
at a premium, they may induce the managers to destroy
long-term value to maximise short-term stock returns.
This argument has several dimensions, which are often
confused with each other. The more extreme version of
the short-termism argument is that the sizeable share-
holder gains brought about by activism are short-lived.71
The empirical evidence does not support this part of the
claim. However, the empirical evidence can neither sup-
port nor reject the short-termism claim in another
important dimension. Managers and dominant share-
holders subject to market pressure, including sharehold-
er activism and the threat thereof, may be reluctant to
invest in projects whose value cannot be incorporated in
stock market prices before a few years hence.72 Let us
discuss the two short-termism critiques in turn.
Two recent studies reject the argument that hedge
funds activism make managers go for the ‘quick buck’
while destroying long-term value. In the first study,
Professors Bebchuk, Brav and Jang show that, in the
United States, the short-term gains stemming from the
announcement of the engagement are not reversed later
on.73 On the contrary, they document that short-term
gains are correct anticipations of the consequences of
engagement up to five years hence.74 The second study,
by Professors Becht, Franks, Grant and Wagner, which
also includes non-U.S. activism, confirms that the posi-
tive stock returns associated with engagement are not
70. Becht et al., above n. 6.
71. M. Lipton, ‘Current Thoughts About Activism’, available at: <http://
corpgov. law. harvard. edu/ 2013/ 08/ 09/ current -thoughts -about -
activism/> (last visited 21 June 2016).
72. A slightly different version of this argument is that hedge funds activism
undermines the long-term relationship of managers and controlling
shareholders with other stakeholders. See e.g. C. Mayer, Firm Commit-
ment: Why the Corporation Is Failing Us and How to Restore Trust in It
(2013). Because this article deals with shareholder feedback in corpo-
rate governance, stakeholders are quite out of its scope; but I will,
nonetheless, briefly discuss this part of the argument infra, text to notes
121-122.
73. Bebchuk and others, above n. 19.
74. Such long-term consequences are estimated on the basis of accounting
and market data for time windows up to five years long. Both tests con-
firm that the returns are abnormally positive for the companies subject
to engagement. Bebchuk and others, above n. 19.
short-term.75 Activists have an average holding period
of 1.7 years, but, more importantly, their buy-and-hold
returns are abnormally positive only if outcomes are
realised. Therefore, hedge funds are not short-termist in
the conventional sense of ‘cutting and running.’ Howev-
er, this says nothing about whether the stock markets
are myopic relative to some horizon longer than the acti-
vists’ holding period,76 let alone about whether it makes
sense to consider such a longer horizon to assess the
performance of any particular company.
The limitations of stock market return as performance
measure are not the only challenge in ascertaining the
desirability of activism. A more fundamental problem
for the empirical analysis is that activism produces
unobservable effects based on the credible threat of
engagement and that the companies that are explicitly
engaged are different from those that are not.77 There-
fore, whether activism increases value compared with an
average measure of performance (being that stock mar-
ket return or some other balance sheet measure) cannot
be inferred from the performance of observable acti-
vism.
The problem is twofold. For one, we observe only a
portion of the true activism, the overt part. This would
not be a problem if the distribution between overt and
covert activism were random, but it is not. Better man-
aged companies react in anticipation of hedge fund
engagement. Moreover, activists go public only when it
is in their interest to do so. Keeping the engagement
confidential is in the interest of both contestants. The
management and particularly the controlling sharehold-
ers have less to lose from non-public concessions to the
activists, while the latter can make larger profits from
those. Activists may have to make their campaign public
precisely when the targeted company is more misman-
aged, which overestimates the observable returns from
engagement.
The second part of the problem is that companies that
are or can be targeted by activists differ in several
respects from those that are not and cannot be targeted.
Consequently, showing that companies successfully
engaged outperform a market index, on average, does
not really prove that activism improves performance.78
It only shows that target companies were undervalued
relative to a market benchmark and that activism brings
75. Becht et al., above n. 6. The authors study the long-term results from
the announcement to the exit of activist hedge funds, and compare
them with the returns of a matching, counterfactual portfolio with no
engagement. Such returns are positive so long as there are outcomes of
engagement.
76. See infra text to notes 99-107.
77. Becht et al., above n. 42.
78. The credibility of empirical analysis is fundamentally based on the defi-
nition of a control group, which provides the counterfactual firm to
which the firm receiving the treatment – i.e. hedge fund engagement –
is to be compared in order to establish causality. See Atanasov and
Black, above n. 25. Although, more recently, the empirical analyses of
hedge fund activism have tried to improve on the identification of cau-
sality through matching samples (supra note 27), this does not entirely
solve the problem. Matching creates an artefact, which may still differ
from the counterfactual firm that has not been engaged, and therefore
might not be sufficient to identify causality.
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performance back in line with that benchmark. These
studies cannot rule out the possibility that a target com-
pany would outperform the benchmark by a larger
extent, if not engaged, because this counterfactual com-
pany does not exist and if it existed, it would be a differ-
ent firm.79
From this perspective, the crucial conflict underlying
hedge funds activism is between two views of the target
firm, one by the activists and another by the incumbent
management. These views normally differ on strategic
issues, such as whether the company should be leaner,
more focused on certain businesses and cost-effective in
carrying them out, which hedge funds typically like to
see. Hedge funds activism can thus be interpreted as a
conflict between visions of the same firm, namely a con-
flict of entrepreneurship. Granted that the empirical
evidence cannot tell us which view should prevail, in the
next section I turn to theory for indications on how to
resolve this conflict efficiently.
3 Hirschman and the Conflict
between Inside and Outside
Entrepreneurship
In his classic, Exit, Voice and Loyalty, Albert Hirschman
was concerned with a problem similar to the one moti-
vating hedge funds activism, namely how to avert the
decline of a (business) organisation.80 Hirschman called
this problem ‘recuperation’,81 which he understood as
the action to correct temporary lapses in an organisa-
tion’s efficiency. Therefore, Hirschman’s theory can
shed light on the conditions that make shareholder acti-
vism desirable for the efficiency of corporate gover-
nance.
Hirschman distinguished between two feedback mecha-
nisms in organisations. Disgruntled members and cus-
tomers can exit their organisation, or they can voice their
disagreement. The relative desirability of exit and voice
depends on which can effectively alert the organisation’s
management about the need for recuperation. Hirsch-
man’s framework applies to several kinds of organisa-
tion. In order to discuss the implications for shareholder
activism, I will focus on three points he made about exit
and voice. First, the optimal mix of exit and voice varies
with context. Second, in corporate governance, invest-
ors tend to prefer exit to voice. Third, loyalty makes the
commitment to voice credible.
According to Hirschman, there is no one-size-fits-all
solution to the recuperation problem. Every organisa-
tion has an optimal level of exposure to exit and voice,
which varies with time. At some point of their life cycle,
79. See Cremers et al. (2016), above n. 27. They find that in the long run,
companies that have not been engaged outperform matching compa-
nies that have been engaged.
80. The full title of Hirschman’s classic (1970), above n. 7, is Exit, Voice,
and Loyalty – Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States.
81. Hirschman, above n. 7, at 3.
business organisations may suffer from excessive exit,
for instance when tough competition in relatively
mature industries gives companies not enough time to
realise decline from the exit of customers and sharehold-
ers.82 In those situations, decline may be averted timely
if the management listens to voice. In terms of the mod-
ern debate, insensitiveness to voice may lead manage-
ment to procrastinate the status quo for want of better
times, which might never come. I call this problem
long-termism, to mirror the short-termism issue more
frequently claimed in today’s debate.83 But, according to
Hirschman, voice can be excessive too for a particular
organisation, particularly when exit is costly or impossi-
ble. Managers’ concern with voice by ‘captive’ custom-
ers, members or voters may distract them from the pur-
suit of efficiency, particularly when uncertainty about
the outlook of business is high as opposed to protest
being present and concrete.84 In the modern parlance,
this is a situation in which excessive sensitiveness to
voice may lead management to focus on the short-term
results necessary to mute the opposing voice. Thus,
short-termism and long-termism of management are
avoided only if individual companies receive feedback as
an optimal mix of voice and exit.
Although Hirschman believed that the optimal feedback
mechanism for purposes of recuperation depends on the
individual organisation, he was not worried about exces-
sive voice by investors in corporate governance. To the
contrary, Hirschman welcomed more voice in business
organisations, but typically from customers, because
individual investors had rationally a strong preference
for the so-called Wall Street Walk, namely exit.85 This
characterisation of shareholders parallels a long-stand-
ing tradition in the corporate governance literature. In a
seminal article, Professor Manne famously argued that
takeovers, which are based on exit, are superior to proxy
fights, which are based on voice.86 While markets,
including the market for corporate control, are powerful
coordination mechanisms, voting is plagued by free rid-
ing problems. To be sure, free riding affects takeovers
too.87 More important, the impact of takeovers and
takeover threat on corporate governance may be oversta-
ted. On the one hand, decades of experience with take-
overs have revealed that they are able to address only
severe underperformance.88 On the other hand, hostile
takeovers are impossible for most companies around the
world, and management seems able to always achieve
82. Ibid., at 24-25.
83. However, see the important exception of Giannetti and Yu (2016), dis-
cussed above n. 23.
84. Hirschman, above n. 7, at 70.
85. Ibid., at 46.
86. Manne, above n. 31.
87. S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart, ‘Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem,
and the Theory of the Corporation’, 11 Bell Journal of Economics 42
(1980).
88. P. Bolton, J. Scheinkman & W. Xiong, ‘Executive Compensation and
Short-termist Behaviour in Speculative Markets’, 73 Review of Econom-
ic Studies (2006).
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some degree of insulation from hostile takeovers.89
Thus, Hirschman rightly believed that business organi-
sation could use more, not less, shareholder voice to
timely avert decline.
Hirschman did not consider shareholder activism a via-
ble channel for voice because he wrote before the rise of
hedge funds activism. Entering hedge funds into
Hirschman’s framework implies both that investors’
voice can be effective in corporate governance and that
there may be too much of it. Hedge funds engage a
company’s management by using voice. Their incen-
tives, though, are based on exit, namely on the purchase
of undervalued stock from previous shareholders and
the sale to future shareholders after a successful engage-
ment.90 Voice by institutional investors actually makes
the difference because the success of hedge funds acti-
vism depends on the voting support by institutional
investors. Therefore, to determine whether exposure to
hedge fund activism results in efficient feedback, instead
of managerial long-termism or short-termism, we need
to delve into the incentives of institutional investors to
screen and decide on hedge funds’ proposals.
Institutional investors differ considerably from one
another. These differences affect their incentives to act
upon hedge fund engagements. According to Hirsch-
man, the quality of voice depends on the loyalty of a
customer or a member to an organisation. Loyalty is, in
turn, defined by high cost of exit.91 Because costly exit
commits shareholders to voice, we can identify loyal
institutional investors on the basis of their propensity to
exit. In this vein, Professor Bushee divided institutional
investors on the basis of portfolio turnover and the size
of their stakes in portfolio companies.92 Investors are
transient when their turnover is high and the stakes are
small. Dedicated investors are the opposite. As they
focus on specific companies, their stakes are relatively
large – although they are still diversified – and they
trade relatively infrequently. Quasi-indexers are well
exemplified by funds that track market indices, although
they include more than strictly indexed funds. Because
they mimic the indices they are tracking, such funds
trade infrequently and have small stakes in portfolio
companies. For the period 1983-2002, Bushee reports
that transient investors accounted for 31% of U.S. insti-
tutional investors, whereas dedicated investors and qua-
si-indexers amounted to 8% and 61%, respectively.93
Although the above percentages are not asset-weighted
and thus do not reflect the ownership of a typical U.S.
corporation, they show the importance of transient
investors. Transient investors are not loyal to any com-
89. J. Arlen and E. Talley, ‘Unregulable Defenses and the Perils of Share-
holder Choice’, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 577 (2003).
90. As Gilson and Gordon, above n. 16, at 897, put it, hedge funds are
‘governance entrepreneurs’ who profit from purchasing rights underval-
ued by ‘rationally reticent’ institutional investors. See also supra text to
notes 49-50.
91. Hirschman, above n. 7, at 80.
92. Bushee, above n. 21.
93. B.J. Bushee, ‘Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence
on the Behavior of Institutional Investors’, 16 Journal of Applied Corpo-
rate Finance 28 (2004).
pany; hence, they are the least committed to voice.
Moreover, transient investors are ready to short-term
exit. Therefore, they can cash in the announcement
gains from engagement. If a company were owned pri-
marily by them, hedge funds could easily have their way
with management through a wolf pack strategy, namely
buying collectively sufficient ownership on the market
to outvote incumbent managers.94 Even before the
advent of entrepreneurial activism, disproportionate
ownership by transient investors was associated with
short-termist managerial behaviour.95
If companies are not primarily owned by transient
investors, hedge funds activism does not necessarily lead
to short-termism because of the screening by other
long-term institutional investors. As they focus on the
companies they invest in, dedicated investors perform
such a screening although they are not to be considered
‘loyal’ in Hirschman’s sense. In fact, they usually govern
through exit.96 Exit is costlier for dedicated than for
transient investors because the larger size of their stakes
prevents dedicated investors from profiting from short-
term price movements. However, this is not enough to
commit dedicated investors to voice because they are
still better off timely exiting the companies they are dis-
satisfied with. Dedicated investors use their informa-
tional advantage to threaten managers with exit and exe-
cute the threat when they are persuaded that the compa-
ny will be actually underperforming. So, in a sense,
dedicated investors screen hedge funds activism by pre-
empting it. But if they agree with the reasons for hedge
funds engagement, they will rather sell than vote their
shares.97
That leaves us with just one category of loyal institu-
tional investors, in Hirschman’s sense, to screen hedge
funds’ proposals with their voice. These are the quasi-
indexers, which cannot exit strategically, but only to
rebalance their index-tracking portfolios. Fortunately,
they are also the largest category of investors. Although
there are currently no data on how large the stake of
quasi-indexers is in the typical listed company, it is fair
to assume that they are often decisive.98 Then the ques-
tion about the desirability of hedge funds activism could
be resolved in the affirmative if one could trust quasi-
indexers to assess whether hedge funds activism is val-
ue-increasing and vote accordingly.
Identifying the right strategy to maximise profit is noto-
riously difficult. Stock markets are an impressive source
94. See supra text to notes 65-68.
95. Bushee, above n. 21.
96. A. Edmans and G. Manso, ‘Governance through Trading and Interven-
tion: A Theory of Multiple Blockholders’, 24 Review of Financial Studies
2395 (2011).
97. Recent theory, field data and survey evidence all confirm that dedicated
investors participate in corporate governance through exit. See e.g. A.
Edmans, ‘Blockholders and Corporate Governance’, 6 Annual Review of
Financial Economics 23 (2014) and McChahery and others, above n.
63.
98. As suggested by the recent DuPont case, where indexed investors such
as Blackrock, Vanguard and State Street made the engagement fail, this
assumption is plausible at least for the United States. See Coffee, above
n. 3.
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of information in this respect, but alas, they are imper-
fect.99 Because they overreact to news, misprice risks
and are prone to asset bubbles,100 stock market prices
may temporarily fail to incorporate the value of future
profit opportunities. When this is the case, the Efficient
Capital Market Hypothesis (ECMH) does not hold
true.101 Therefore, there might be a conflict between the
pursuit of short-term results, which are immediately
impounded in market prices, and long-term projects,
whose expected results are underweighted or even over-
looked by stock prices.102 Short-termism is an issue for
corporate governance only if it affects managerial
choices.103 Hedge funds could lead to short-termism in
management because their business model relies on
stock market prices – buying undervalued stock and
reselling it after successful engagements. If, however,
the crucial element of the strategy – engagement’s suc-
cess – depends on indexed funds, the real question
becomes whether quasi-indexers too are biased towards
short-termism.
The empirical evidence suggests that, under the screen-
ing by indexed funds, overt hedge funds activism does
not lead to obvious short-termism. As discussed in the
previous section, the data show that the short-term
gains of successful hedge funds activism are not
reversed in the subsequent five years, whereas there are
no gains from engagements that turned out unsuccess-
fully for lack of (prospective) support by institutional
investors. However, the performance of overt activism is
uninformative about companies that have not been
99. Even before the advent of behavioural finance, it was clear in both the
legal and the economic scholarship that informational efficiency was a
process rather than an instant result. See R.J. Gilson and R.H. Kraak-
man, ‘The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency’, 70 Virginia Law Review
549 (1984), and S.J. Grossman and J.E. Stiglitz, ‘On the Impossibility of
Informationally Efficient Markets’, 70 American Economic Review 393
(1980). Arguably, behavioural finance as well as the debate stemming
from the global financial crisis have not changed this basic insight,
namely that informational efficiency is a relative concept depending on
the speed with which prices adjust to existing knowledge. See R.J. Gil-
son and R.H. Kraakman, ‘Market Efficiency after the Financial Crisis: It’s
Still a Matter of Information Costs’, 100 Virginia Law Review 313
(2014).
100. The main problems undermining the efficiency of financial markets are
limits of arbitrage (A. Shleifer and W. Vishny, ‘The Limits of Arbitrage’,
52 Journal of Finance 35 (1997)), excess volatility (A. Fuster et al.,
‘Natural Expectations, Macroeconomic Dynamics, and Asset Pricing’,
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. w17301
(2011)) and asset price bubbles (Bolton and others, above n. 88, at
577).
101. The ECMH is based on arbitrage. A fundamental principle of economics
is that arbitrageurs would never forego a profit opportunity so long as
they can grab it. When they cannot, because for instance they are capi-
tal constrained or there is uncertainty, price may deviate from funda-
mentals. Until this situation is corrected, market may overvalue short-
term strategies and undervalue long-term strategies. Although this dif-
ference will be arbitraged away, eventually, long-term value might be
destroyed in the process.
102. See A.G. Haldane and R. Davies, ‘The Short Long’, 29th Société Univer-
sitaire Européene de Recherches Financiéres Colloquium: New Para-
digms in Money and Finance?, Brussels (2011) for extensive illustration
of theory and evidence on the short-termism of financial markets.
103. The short termism of financial market does not necessarily imply that
corporate managers are short-termist and, even more important, that
short-termism is undesirable for corporate governance. See Roe, above
n. 15.
engaged, and therefore cannot lead to a conclusive judg-
ment about hedge funds activism. A recent study reveals
that in the long run the performance of engaged compa-
nies is lower than that of comparable companies that
were not engaged.104 Moreover, the question whether
the sheer threat of activism induces short-termism in
management and whether this is desirable cannot be
answered empirically. I now turn to the reasons why
theory too does not provide a unique answer to this
question.
To begin with, short-termism is ill-defined. Because
short-termism is an issue only if the ECMH fails, the
value of a long-term option is defined only by what it is
not: the market price failing to incorporate it. As a
result, opinions of reasonable minds differ as to which
long term is ‘right’ for purposes of profit maximisation.
Second, even if one could settle on a conventional defi-
nition of long term (say, five years), companies oriented
to the long term would be radically different from those
oriented to a shorter term. Comparing the returns of
these companies on horizons different from what they
have chosen is not very meaningful.105 Third, whether
managing for the long term or the short term is prefera-
ble is theoretically unclear. Professor Fried has shown
that, under certain conditions, pursuing the interest of
long-term shareholders can lead management to destroy
more value than if they managed in the interest of short-
term shareholders.106 More importantly, the ‘right’
horizon to maximise profit is endogenous to the compa-
ny’s business and the state of product market competi-
tion. Whether managers suffer from short-termism or
long-termism relative to this horizon depends on com-
pany-specific circumstances.107
As recently put by Professor Gordon, the short-termism
debate on hedge fund activism is a red herring for a
deeper corporate governance problem.108 The problem
is in determining who should decide between alternative
company strategies, each implying different horizons for
feedback. I call this problem a conflict of entrepreneur-
ship because it stems from two conflicting, potentially
entrepreneurial views of the target company – the view
of the activists versus that of the incumbent manage-
ment. Such views are entrepreneurial to the extent that
they reflect a shortcoming of stock prices rather than
managerial opportunism. The stock price cannot fully
104. See Cremers et al., above n. 27 (using several matching techniques to
compare companies engaged and not engaged by hedge funds). On
the limitations of matching methods to identify causality between
hedge funds activism and firm variables, see supra note 78.
105. On these grounds, the findings of Cremers et al., above n. 27, are as
questionable as those of their opponents (Bebchuk and others, above n.
19). In fact, as argued below in the text, the optimal horizon to maxi-
mise profits is endogenous to firm-specific circumstances.
106. Fried, above n. 22.
107. Giannetti and Yu, above n. 23, show that long-termism undermines the
ability of companies to deal with a highly dynamic and competitive
environment.
108. J.N. Gordon, ‘Shareholder Activism, the Short-Termist Red-Herring, and
the Need for Corporate Governance Reform’, available at: <http://
clsbluesky. law. columbia. edu/ 2016/ 03/ 28/ shareholder -activism -the -
short -termist -red -herring -and -the -need -for -corporate -governance -
reform/> (last visited 17 June 2016).
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account for the future because it is uncertain. Uncer-
tainty is for entrepreneurs, not for markets, to bear.109
According to two prominent students of uncertainty –
Frank Knight and John Maynard Keynes – financial
markets are only one way to deal with uncertainty, by
incorporating all available information into a probabilis-
tic risk assessment.110 Because nobody knows how a dis-
tant future, call it ‘long term’, will look like, stock mar-
kets process information within a relatively short hori-
zon, in which no change from established trends can be
assumed. The vast majority of investors make decisions
under the same assumption, which is thus reflected by
market prices too. The role of the entrepreneur is to
deal instead with genuine uncertainty that, differently
from risk, cannot be quantified. Entrepreneurship is
based on long-term expectations, which incorporate all
information available to financial markets, but differ
from market price in one fundamental respect: they also
include a guess about forthcoming change.111 Therefore,
when hedge fund activists and their opponents advocate
two different strategies to ‘beat the market’, the discus-
sion about the right horizon to assess performance may
conceal a conflict between entrepreneurs having a dif-
ferent opinion about changes and their impact on per-
formance. From this perspective, quasi-indexers
become decisive between two entrepreneurial views on
how the target company should move forward. Whether
they are the right arbiters for this choice depends on
context.
One strategic issue on which the views of activists and
incumbent management often collide is quality and
quantity of R&D expenditures. The incumbent manage-
ment usually asks for the return on R&D expenditures
to be assessed over a longer horizon. Activist hedge
funds, instead, want the companies to be leaner and
more focused on developing specific products, which
usually results in cuts of R&D and personnel expendi-
tures and larger short-term profits.112 Overall reduction
of R&D expenditures does not necessarily imply that
the company is less innovative.113 A recent study shows
that activism can improve productivity and R&D output
on several counts.114 Still, granted that activism tends to
reduce R&D input, this may not be the right choice for a
number of companies. Another theoretical study, unre-
lated to activism, reveals that different kinds of innova-
tion benefit from different organisational forms.115 In
particular, complex innovations with long life cycles
benefit from conglomerate structures in which R&D can
be redirected internally from a project to another. Those
are precisely the structures that activists seek to break
up.
109. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
110. Knight, above n. 28, at 233-63; and J.M. Keynes, ‘The General Theory
of Employment’, 51 Quarterly Journal of Economics 209 (1937).
111. See Keynes, above n. 28, at 96-106.
112. Coffee and Palia, above n. 54.
113. Bebchuk and others, above n. 19.
114. Brav et al., above n. 27.
115. S. Belenzon, P. Bolton & U. Tsolmon, ‘The Organization of Innovation
across Countries and Industries’, Unpublished Working Paper, Duke
University (2013).
Indexed funds are unlikely to stop hedge funds whenev-
er saving on R&D expenditures appears to be the wrong
strategy. The empirical evidence is that, although insti-
tutional investors generally support R&D investments,
this support does not stem from quasi-indexers.116 This
aligns with theory. Quasi-indexers are highly diversified
investors that do not benefit from firm-specific screen-
ing. Because their income depends on the assets under
management, they choose low-cost voting policies that
the market appreciates overall, including best practices
in corporate governance and/or in a particular
industry.117 Arguably, indexed funds decide whether to
support hedge funds based on the same criteria. Wheth-
er the target company should engage in linear or non-
linear innovation is a much more idiosyncratic question
that quasi-indexers are not interested in answering.
Relying on the judgment by quasi-indexers is efficient
in other situations. Not all instances of stock market
underperformance that trigger hedge funds activism
really depend on strategic choices. Often the matter is
much simpler, namely whether the controlling manage-
ment is wasting resources. There the advantage of qua-
si-indexers’ voting in a standardised, predictable fashion
on a hedge fund’s memo showing waste is that they can
commit the company’s management to refrain from
opportunism. This commitment is valuable, because it
makes investors more willing to invest in the first place.
Facing the threat of hedge funds teaming up with insti-
tutional investors, managers have to be more careful
about misusing fee cash or being unresponsive to the
competitive environment. In the absence of such ‘recu-
peration mechanism,’ as Hirschman put it, excessive
consumption of perquisites, pet projects, if not empire
building, could dissipate enormous value until the com-
pany is bankrupt or is acquired. Hedge funds activism
can stop this well before the decline becomes irrecovera-
ble. Moreover, because entrepreneurial activism is a
credible threat in all countries where declining compa-
nies can be engaged, even dominant shareholders may
have to refrain from self-dealing for fear of engagement
by hedge funds.
As the example of R&D expenditures shows, the com-
mitment towards outside investors supported by hedge
funds activism risks becoming excessive when the rea-
son for the activists’ targeting a company is disagree-
ment about the company’s strategy. In such a situation,
the strategy proposed by hedge funds in opposition to
116. See P. Aghion, J. van Reenen & L. Zingales, ‘Innovation and Institution-
al Ownership’, 103 American Economic Review 277 (2013). This study
utilises an interesting strategy to identify causality. Companies’ inclusion
into market indices arguably matters for the investment by index track-
ers, but it is unlikely to affect R&D expenditures via other channels.
Based on a similar identification strategy, another study reports a statis-
tically insignificant impact of quasi-indexers on R&D (Appel and others,
above n. 62), although according to a different study the presence of
long-term indexers reduces R&D expenditures. See J. Harford, A.
Kecskes & S. Mansi, ‘Do Long-Term Investors Improve Corporate Deci-
sion Making?’, Finance Down Under 2015 Building on the Best from
the Cellars of Finance Paper (2015), available at <http:// ssrn. com/
abstract= 2505261> (last visited 21 June 2016).
117. Appel and others, above n. 62, at 113.
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the incumbent management is particularly difficult to
evaluate. Moreover, the judgment of ‘loyal’ investors
such as indexed funds cannot be relied on because the
question is not simply whether existing resources are
being managed efficiently, but rather how resources
should be directed towards an uncertain future. This is
an entrepreneurship question that indexed funds, with
their typically small stakes in a particular company, do
not have the expertise and the incentives to answer. In
this respect, indexed funds crucially differ from venture
capitalists, which specialise in dealing with entrepre-
neurship questions.118
If not the ‘loyal’ institutional investors, who should
decide whenever hedge funds activism triggers a conflict
of entrepreneurship? As Professor Mayer recently put
it, there is a trade-off between commitment and control
in corporate governance, and we should let individual
companies decide which mix suits their circumstances
best.119 In Mayer’s framework, control is understood as
commitment to one particular constituency, namely
commitment to outside investors. Another way to put
the trade-off is whether the company should commit to
the feedback engineered by entrepreneurial activists or
to something else, for instance the entrepreneurship of
inside management.120 More in general, some compa-
nies may benefit from less investors control and more
commitment to stakeholders other than the sharehold-
ers, including employees, creditors and entrepreneurs.121
Similarly to Mayer, this article contends that companies
should decide ‘who decides’ in the event of hedge fund
engagement. Differently from Mayer, however, this
article argues that the dilemma about hedge funds acti-
vism is only whether a company should commit to
inside or outside entrepreneurship, not to any other
stakeholder. Here I follow the standard corporate gover-
nance argument against the inclusion of stakeholders in
the company’s objective function. This argument is
twofold.122 First, differently from shareholders, stake-
holders can protect themselves through contracts. Sec-
ond, the externalities of a business on stakeholders do
not depend on corporate governance and therefore
should not be addressed by corporate governance regu-
lation. None of these arguments apply to entrepreneur-
ship. Entrepreneurs cannot effectively protect their
investment by contract. Moreover, lack of entrepreneur-
ship in listed companies is a direct consequence (nega-
tive externality) of corporate governance. On this basis,
in the next section, I will discuss how corporate law can
support entrepreneurship by allowing companies to
choose the desired degree of exposure to activism and to
alter it over time.
118. See R.J. Gilson, ‘Engineering a Venture Capital Market: Lessons from
the American Experience’, 55 Stanford Law Review 1067 (2003).
119. Mayer, above n. 72, at 234-36.
120. In the past, I have framed this as a trade-off between (entrepreneurial)
discretion and (market) accountability. See Pacces, above n. 29, at
145-46.
121. Mayer, above n. 72, at 152-53.
122. See Pacces, above n. 29, at 74-82.
4 Evaluating the Policy
Options
The policy debate on shareholder activism differs con-
siderably from the foregoing discussion. Prompted by
the standard narrative about the global financial crisis,
policymakers hold institutional investors (including
hedge funds) responsible for short-termism in corporate
governance.123 Ideally, policymakers would like to
replace hedge funds’ influence with the engagement of
longer-term shareholders, regarded as more ‘loyal,’
albeit not exactly in Hirschman’s sense. As we have
seen, however, loyalty is no panacea. Neither is long-
term ownership. This point is widely acknowledged also
by academics sympathetic to the short-termism argu-
ment.124 While these commentators argue that compa-
nies under the influence, or threat, of hedge funds acti-
vism cater to the short-termism of the stock market,
they recognise that very many companies benefit from
short-term market pressure. Companies that suffer from
this pressure, however, should be able to effectively opt
out of hedge funds’ influence. Other commentators dis-
agree with this point, claiming that short-termism is not
a problem for anyone but the incumbent managers who
seek insulation from activism, as previously from hostile
takeovers, in order to disenfranchise the shareholders.125
Having argued that the short-termism debate cannot
shed light on the limitations of shareholder activism, I
will analyse the main policy proposals to curb activists’
powers from the perspective of conflict of entrepreneur-
ship.
The first set of proposals concern the disclosure of acti-
vists’ ownership.126 Activists’ business model is funda-
mentally based on the purchase of undervalued stock (a
so-called “toehold”) while the market is still in the dark
about the hedge fund’s intentions. Thus, the obvious
way to undermine activism is to reduce the size of the
toehold that can be purchased profitably. Ownership
disclosure regulation can have this chilling effect
through the following policy variables127: (a) the thresh-
old above which ownership needs be disclosed; (b) the
time window available to activists since the crossing of
the threshold; (c) the regulatory treatment of groups of
activists. In the extreme, if a block larger than, say,
0.5% had to be disclosed within an hour of crossing the
threshold by any group of shareholders intending to
123. See e.g. European Parliament, Amendments adopted by the European
Parliament on 8 July 2015 on the proposal for a directive of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2007/36/EC as
regards the encouragement of long-term shareholder engagement and
Directive 2013/34/EU as regards certain elements of the corporate gov-
ernance statement, 2014-2019, P8_TA(2015)0257 (hereinafter EP
Amendments 2015).
124. See Bolton and Samama, above n. 18; Mayer, above n. 72.
125. See, most vigorously, L.A. Bebchuk, ‘The Myth That Insulating Boards
Serves Long-Term Value’, 113 Columbia Law Review 1637 (2013).
126. See supra text to notes 16-17.
127. See L. Enriques, M. Gargantini & V. Novembre, ‘Mandatory and Con-
tract-Based Shareholding Disclosure’, 15 Uniform Law Review 713
(2010) for a similar argument applied to takeovers.
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vote against the management, hedge funds activism
would likely disappear. Proposals along these lines,
albeit less extreme, have been aired in the American
debate but, partly owing to wide opposition by authori-
tative academics, the SEC is no longer considering
changing the status quo.128 A 5% threshold, a 10-day
window to disclose it and the irrelevance of conscious
parallelism in voting still make the U.S. legal environ-
ment one of the most favourable to shareholder activism
worldwide. Many jurisdictions in Europe impose a low-
er threshold and a shorter window.129 Note that, in
Europe, the discussion about tightening ownership dis-
closure regulation is still ongoing.130
If we look at shareholder activism through the lens of
conflict of entrepreneurship, curbing one of the oppos-
ing entrepreneurial activities, namely hedge funds acti-
vism, is not the way to solve the conflict. This approach
would be economically justified only if hedge funds acti-
vism was on average detrimental to shareholder value,
whether because of short-termism or otherwise. As
shown in Section 2, this claim is not borne out by the
empirical evidence, which actually suggests the oppo-
site. However, the sheer threat of activism – whose
effects are unobservable – could still be value-destroying
if some of the activists’ strategies were nearly riskless, as
Professors Coffee and Palia have argued wolf pack strat-
egies are.131 Albeit impossible to falsify empirically, this
claim seems as overstated as the actual impact of wolf
packs.132 Engagements by wolf packs remain a risky
strategy that do not lead to obvious short-termism, for
arguably, institutional investors would not support val-
ue-destroying engagements and, under this expectation,
wolf packs would not be formed in the first place.
To be sure, as argued in the previous section, hedge
funds activism could induce management to choose
short-term strategies that are suboptimal for the partic-
ular company. Wolf packs would make this problem
worse. However, from a conflict of entrepreneurship
perspective, mandatory rules to curb the power of wolf
packs, such as the inclusion of the group members in the
leading activist’s disclosure, are unwarranted. Compa-
nies that want to discourage activism, whether individu-
al or in concert, have plenty of ways to do so. Counter-
measures range from low-trigger poison pills (in the
United States),133 to functionally equivalent dilutive
techniques in those jurisdictions where they are allowed
128. See Coffee and Palia, above n. 54.
129. For instance, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the UK feature a 3%
threshold and an obligation to disclose that varies between 2 and 4
days. See Gilson and Gordon, above n. 16.
130. A proposal was made recently by the Legal Affairs Committee of the
European Parliament to mandate disclosure above 0.5%. See Cofferati
Report (2015), above n. 12. This proposal, however, was not included
in EP Amendments (2015). The discussion between the EU institutions
on this and related curbs on shareholder activism is still ongoing at the
time of writing.
131. Coffee and Palia, above n. 54, at 29.
132. See supra text to notes 69-70.
133. Coffee and Palia, above n. 54, at 32. However, also see Gilson and
Gordon, above n. 69, on the unimportance of the poison pill when
hedge funds garner sufficient support from the institutional investors.
(e.g. the Netherlands),134 to dual-class shares, which in
one way or another can be engineered nearly every-
where.135 Importantly, activism is also observed in the
presence of these countermeasures.136
The fundamental argument of this article is that hedge
funds activism should be evaluated in the specific con-
text in which it operates. For some companies, in a cer-
tain stage of their life cycle, exposure to activism is effi-
cient; for others, or for the same companies at another
point in time, it is not. From this perspective, the more
interesting proposals in the policy debate are those
offering individual companies instruments to tailor
exposure to activism to their circumstances, for instance
depending on whether it is optimal for them to profile
on short-term or longer-term strategies.
Seemingly, one instrument for companies to tailor expo-
sure to hedge funds activism is rewarding shareholders
who were, or will be, invested in the company for some
time with a higher voting power.137 These shareholder
voting structures are known under various names, but
perhaps the better known designation in Europe –
where they have been most popular of late – is ‘loyalty
shares.’138 Although their assonance with Hirschman’s
framework is accidental, the function of loyalty shares is
much in the spirit of Hirschman’s argument that voice
134. Dutch preference shares are functionally equivalent to U.S. poison pills,
and can be used to fend off both hostile takeovers and activism. See L.
Chazen and P. Werdmuller, ‘The Dutch Poison Pill: How Is It Different
from an American Rights Plan?’, available at <https:// corpgov. law.
harvard. edu/ 2015/ 12/ 01/ the -dutch -poison -pill -how -is -it -different -from
-an -american -rights -plan/> (last visited 21 June 2016).
135. See R. Adams and D. Ferreira, ‘One Share-One Vote: The Empirical Evi-
dence’, 12 Review of Finance 51 (2008). The recent history of corpo-
rate mobility also reveals that companies who want dual class shares
simply move to jurisdictions allowing them. See M. Ventoruzzo, ‘The
Disappearing Taboo of Multiple Voting Shares: Regulatory Responses to
the Migration of Chrysler-Fiat’, ECGI Working Paper Series in Law No.
288/2015. In the UK, the moves towards control enhancement of dom-
inant shareholdings have triggered a tightening of (the Premium seg-
ment of) the listing regime, which has been criticised by some commen-
tators. See B.R. Cheffins, ‘The Undermining of UK Corporate Gover-
nance (?)’, 33 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 503 (2013) and R. Bark-
er and I.H-Y. Chiu, ‘Protecting Minority Shareholders in Blockholder-
Controlled Companies: Evaluating the UK’s Enhanced Listing Regime in
Comparison with Investor Protection Regimes in New York and Hong
Kong’, 10 Capital Markets Law Journal 98 (2015).
136. On activism in controlled companies, see K. Kastiel, ‘Against All Odds:
Shareholder Activism in Controlled Companies’ (2015), available at
<http:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 2628987> (last visited 22 June 2016). See
also supra note 5.
137. Reward can be in terms of voting rights or cash-flow rights. Because
most of the policy and academic debate has been on rewarding long-
term shareholdings by means of voting rights, this article also focuses
on voting power. However, it is important to note the prominent
exception of Bolton and Samama, above n. 18, who have proposed to
incentivise long-term shareholding exclusively by means of extra cash-
flow rights.
138. See J. Delvoie and C. Clottens, ‘Accountability and Short-Termism:
Some Notes on Loyalty Shares’, 9 Law and Financial Markets Review
19 (2015). However, see also, for the United States, the functionally
equivalent expressions ‘Time-Phased Voting’ and ‘Tenure Shares’. See
respectively L. Dallas and J.M. Barry, ‘Long-Term Shareholders and
Time-Phased Voting’, Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (DJCL)
(2015); and D.J. Berger, S.M. Davidoff & B.A. Jedidiah, ‘Tenure Voting
and the US Public Company’ (2016), available at: <http:// papers. ssrn.
com/ sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 2740538> (last visited 22 June
2016).
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can be excessive for a particular organisation. Loyalty
shares are there to curb hedge funds activism in the
companies that adopt them. The requirement of loyalty
is the least important part of their effectiveness,
although it has undoubtedly contributed to make loyalty
shares politically palatable.
Loyalty shares are a French invention. While prohibit-
ing multiple voting shares, French law allowed compa-
nies to grant one additional vote to shareholders that
had held shares continuously for two years. This was
optional for every French company until, in 2014, the
Loi Florange made loyalty shares the default regime for
listed companies. This move has virtually imposed loy-
alty shares on existing listed companies. Companies that
did not have loyalty shares in place automatically got
them, unless they opted out of the default rule. Howev-
er, opting out of loyalty shares requires an amendment
of the articles of association, which in France is gov-
erned by a two-third majority and hence can be vetoed
by only one-third of the votes. Therefore, dominant
shareholders could push loyalty shares despite the oppo-
sition of institutional investors, as the French govern-
ment did recently in the Renault case.139
Loyalty shares have been popular elsewhere in Europe.
Fiat-Chrysler Automobiles (FCA), Italy’s largest fami-
ly-owned corporation, reincorporated to the Nether-
lands allegedly in order to adopt loyalty shares, which
were not allowed in Italy.140 Subsequently, Italian law
was amended and now allows listed companies to opt
into French-style loyalty shares with a two-third majori-
ty. Italy allowed companies to amend their articles with
a simple majority for a transition period, whose prolon-
gation was stopped by the opposition of institutional
investors and several academics, including the author of
this article.141 It is noteworthy that, in Europe, loyalty
shares have been typically implemented by existing
companies in the midstream, with dominant sharehold-
ers being decisive, although formally all shareholders
fulfilling the loyalty requirements qualify for the extra
vote(s).
Loyalty shares are appealing because they seem to
empower all shareholders equally on a dimension other
than the size of their investment, namely the time of
their investment. Loyalty shares are thought to reba-
lance shareholder powers from activists to long-term
investors. On the assumption that hedge funds activism
leads to short-termism and that the latter is always det-
rimental for a company, policymakers, including some
members of the European Parliament, advocated the
introduction of loyalty shares across the European
139. See ’Shareholders Rights in Europe – Short-Term or Short-Changed?’,
The Economist (May 2, 2015).
140. Ventoruzzo, above n. 135.
141. See the text of the petition and the response by the Italian Ministry of
the Economy at <http:// oneshareonevote. org> (last visited 17 June
2016).
Union.142 Similarly, academics have argued that allow-
ing companies to opt into loyalty shares or other time-
varying voting system would cope with short-termism
precisely when it is detrimental. Surprisingly, however,
institutional investors – including the owners that
would qualify for the loyalty benefits – almost invariably
oppose the introduction of loyalty shares.
Loyalty shares are not as good as they look, and they
look different from what they are. To start from their
flaws, loyalty shares do not really commit to anything,
let alone to long-term strategies. Having held shares for
any number of years says nothing about for how much
longer investors will hold them, although this is crucial
for their voting strategy. To cope with this problem,
Professor Mayer proposed to allow companies to give
voting rights proportional to a residual holding period to
which investors commit ex ante. Super-voting loyalty
shares would be inalienable for the committed period,
and could only be redeemed prior to maturity at a pen-
alty in terms of both price and voting rights.143
Although ingenious, this proposal has a few shortcom-
ings that are hard to overcome.
To begin with, the link between voting rights and hold-
ing periods, whether past or future, can be circumven-
ted so long as disclosure of the ultimate beneficial own-
ership can be avoided. An intermediary company could
qualify for the loyalty benefits by locking in ownership,
but defer to its beneficial owners for how to vote the
loyalty shares. Such beneficial owners, who could be
transient investors, will de facto control the extra voting
rights. To be sure, several mechanisms have been pro-
posed to track loyalty to the beneficial owners, for
instance special rules to register the loyalty shares as a
precondition for enjoying their benefits.144 In considera-
tion of the administrative costs, the French legislator
has decided to drop those mechanisms.145 Moreover, in
the absence of a case-by-case screening, which would
require board discretion and thus expose to directors’
opportunism, curbs on shareholders’ arbitrage of voting
rights are unlikely to work. As the experience with
hedge funds activism suggests, the arbitrage of gover-
nance rights can be so profitable that it is difficult to
imagine low-cost solutions that could cope with it.146
142. This proposal, originally included in the Cofferati Report (2015), above
n. 12, has disappeared from the official documents. However, it is still
being considered. See K.J. Hopt, ‘Corporate Governance in Europe: A
Critical Review of the European Commission’s Initiatives on Corporate
Law and Corporate Governance’, 12 New York University Journal of
Law & Business 139 (2015), at 158.
143. See Mayer, above n. 72, at 265.
144. See Bolton and Samama, above n. 18; Berger et al., above n. 138.
145. Delvoie and Clottens, above n. 138, at 28.
146. Mayer, above n. 72, at 266-67, is more optimistic about the possibility
to stop the arbitrage of voting rights between long-term shareholders
and short-term beneficial owners. In his view, linking the extra voting
rights to a future holding period makes it progressively more difficult for
short-term beneficial owners to create liquidity through policies that
undermine long-term returns – in the last period, it may be difficult for
owners to sell shares whose long-term value has been undermined. This
argument neglects the impact of stock market bubbles, which can go
on for several years. As shown by H. Minsky, in Stabilizing an Unstable
Economy (1986), refinancing debt can prop up asset prices (including
stock prices) indefinitely, until a debt crisis occurs.
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Furthermore, loyalty shares committing to a holding
period entrench control. For instance, in the event of a
takeover, only the shareholders loyal to the management
would retain the extra voting rights; that might be
enough to fend off a hostile bid. There are ways to get
around this problem, but they all would make loyalty
shares less attractive. For example, Eumedion – a Dutch
foundation representing the interests of several institu-
tional investors – proposed to cap the extra voting rights
at 5% in order to prevent dominant shareholders from
using loyalty shares as a control enhancing
mechanism.147 On a different note, having in mind
shares rewarding loyalty exclusively with pecuniary
benefits, professors Bolton and Samama suggested mak-
ing such benefits expire in the event of a takeover bid.148
Whereas a similar contingency approach could be
applied to voting rights, it is very doubtful that loyalty
shares would be as attractive if deprived of their
entrenchment effect.
Loyalty shares are effectively dual-class shares in dis-
guise. Formally, loyalty shares look different from dual-
class shares because they allocate superior voting rights
to any investor fulfilling the holding period require-
ments attached to them, not just to the holder of a spe-
cific class of shares. Hence, loyalty shares look like a
remedy against short-termism, not an entrenchment
device for managers or controlling shareholders.149 In
reality, loyalty shares are attractive precisely when they
operate as dual-class shares. Loyalty shares are uninter-
esting for institutional investors. Transient investors do
not care about loyalty. The commitment of quasi-index-
ers is independent of their voting rights, and they may
forego loyalty benefits simply because of portfolio reba-
lancing. Only dedicated investors could be potentially
interested. However, as we have seen, dedicated invest-
ors rather govern through exit. Hence, they would not
accept committing to loyalty for extra voting rights, if
that cost them the exit option. There remain only share-
holders interested in control to profit from loyalty
shares, namely the management and/or the dominant
shareholders. While non-controlling shareholders are
unlikely to care for the extra voting rights, the incum-
bents can use loyalty shares as super-voting shares
against activist hedge funds who can only have access to
147. See Eumedion, ‘Draft Position Paper on The Position of Minority Share-
holders in Companies with a Dominant Shareholder’ (15 October
2015), available at <http:// eumedion. nl/ en/ public/ knowledgenetwork/
position -papers/ 2015 -10 -draft -position -paper -protection -minority -
shareholders. pdf> (last visited 3 July 2016). The Dutch government,
however, sounded disinclined to adopt this proposal on the grounds
that it would not necessarily fit the needs of some companies. Interest-
ingly, the final version of Eumedion, Position Paper on The Position of
Minority Shareholders in Companies with a Dominant Shareholder (26
June 2016), available at <http:// eumedion. nl/ en/ public/
knowledgenetwork/ position -papers/ 2016 -06 -position -paper -minority -
shareholders -final -version. pdf> (last visited 3 July 2016), does no longer
include the proposal to cap the extra voting rights at 5%, but goes
rather in the direction of the policy recommendations of this article
(approval of the restriction by the majority of the minority and sunset
clauses – see below in the text).
148. Bolton and Samama, above n. 18.
149. See Dallas and Barry, above n. 138.
common stock. This makes sense from a perspective of
conflict of entrepreneurship. Companies that want to
commit to the incumbents’ as opposed to the activists’
entrepreneurship will go for loyalty shares. Because this
strategy undermines the overall impact of institutional
investors, it is no surprise that also long-term investors
oppose loyalty shares. What is unclear at this point is
why the incumbent management prefers loyalty shares
to classic dual-class shares structures.
A key difference between dual-class shares and loyalty
shares is that only the latter can be introduced in the
midstream. A founder concerned with the adverse
impact of activism on certain styles of innovation could
simply go public with dual-class shares, which compa-
nies increasingly do.150 When the managers of an
already listed company have the same concern, they
cannot introduce a super-voting class of shares even
with a favourable shareholder vote. Dual-class recapital-
isations that exchange existing shares for two classes of
shares, one with higher voting rights for the controlling
group and one with lower voting rights for the investors,
are not allowed either in Europe or in the United
States.151 Loyalty shares are a way out of this bind.
Because formally they do not discriminate among share-
holders, companies can issue them in the midstream. In
the United States, this is part of the history of loyalty
shares, which were all introduced in the short time
when it was unclear whether dual-class recapitalisations
were allowed.152 Moreover, according to some commen-
tators, introducing loyalty shares is still possible in the
United States despite the exchanges’ prohibition of
recapitalisations, so long as no existing shareholder is
worse off.153 In Europe, room for loyalty shares has been
created by national legislatures, where it did not exist
before, and may be furthered by the European Union.
But this has created the paradox, revealed by the French
and partly the Italian experience, in which loyalty shares
may be introduced despite the opposition of a majority
of institutional investors.
It would be better to allow dual-class recapitalisations
explicitly and regulate them in such a way as to avoid
misuse by incumbent managers and controlling share-
holders. The potential for misuse is significantly
reduced if investors have veto power on the transaction.
In the past, commentators were concerned that invest-
ors could be coerced into voting for recapitalisations
because of their inability to coordinate.154 The re-con-
centration of ownership by institutional investors has
150. See e.g. Enriques and others, above n. 32 (reporting 170 U.S. compa-
nies going public with dual-class shares between 2010 and 2012). See
also supra, note 135 (Outside the United States, companies can choose
to incorporate in a jurisdiction allowing dual-class shares).
151. See G. Ferrarini, ‘One Share–One Vote: A European Rule?’, 3 European
Company and Financial Law Review 147 (2006).
152. Dallas and Barry, above n. 138. According to the letter of the listing
rules, the midstream introduction of loyalty shares is currently not
allowed in the United States. But see the argument below in the text.
153. Berger et al., above n. 138.
154. See R.J. Gilson, ‘Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance
of Substitutes’, 73 Virginia Law Review 807 (1987) for a critical discus-
sion of the argument.
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made such worries much less compelling. Therefore,
dual-class recaps could be allowed subject to a majority
of minority (MOM) vote. This solution would not only
provide sufficient guarantees to minority shareholders;
it would also screen for situations in which dual-class
shares are efficient from the perspective of conflict of
entrepreneurship. Managers and controlling sharehold-
ers are naturally inclined to curb shareholder powers,
particularly in the midstream, when investors cannot
collectively withdraw equity. However, a MOM vote
requires the proponent to signal that the restriction is
value-increasing in order to gain the approval by minor-
ity shareholders.
The one-share-one-vote regime (1S1V) should not be a
constraint on the flexibility of established listed compa-
nies, but rather become a ‘sticky default’, as Professor
Ayres put it.155 A sticky default is a quasi-mandatory
rule that, by design, is expensive to alter for the average
person or company. The purpose of sticky defaults is to
enable opt-out only by those parties for which the
default rule would be inefficient, because otherwise the
cost of opting out would outweigh the benefits. If the
management wants to introduce dual-class shares to take
advantage of minority shareholders, the latter will not
consent unless they are paid the full expected value of
expropriation. Conversely, the management of a compa-
ny with a project that could take too long for the market
to appreciate may derive net benefits from persuading
institutional investors to enter into a dual-class recapi-
talisation. Because institutional investors will typically
have a policy against dual-class shares, management will
have to commit to a value-increasing strategy. The key
question is, then, what commitment is likely to persuade
institutional investors to accept the deal.
The baseline to compare this hypothetical contract is a
going private transaction, which could likewise enable a
dual-class recapitalisation.156 Going private requires the
management to find a financier, for which they will have
to commit their personal wealth and offer sufficient
guarantees to outside investors. As founders commit
their private wealth when they go public with a dual-
class voting structure, by investing sufficient capital in
Class-A shares, so could the management or the domi-
nant shareholders of an already listed company. In the
midstream, additional guarantees may be needed to per-
suade institutional investors, thereby saving on the cost
of taking the company private. First, controllers will
want to commit against self-dealing for as long as they
retain extra voting rights. Minority board representation
is a credible signal for this, because by sitting on the
board, investors’ representatives can stop expropriation
in most western jurisdictions.157 Minority board seats,
155. See Ayres, above n. 34, at 2032, 2084-88 on ‘Impeding altering rules’.
156. Another way to do it is by reincorporation, which is comparable to the
solution being advocated in this article, because it requires a favourable
vote by minority shareholders.
157. On the role of minority-appointed directors to curb self-dealing, see
A.M. Pacces, ‘Controlling the Corporate Controller’s Misbehaviour’, 11
Journal of Corporate Law Studies 177 (2011) (assuming that courts are
sufficiently reliable to enforce the appointment of minority directors).
however, are not enough to undermine long-term strat-
egies. Second, in order to commit against a never-end-
ing long-term, which investors would not accept, the
restriction to protect insiders’ entrepreneurship could
be time-bound. Dual-class shares could be set to expire
in a horizon agreed upon, during which the goals of the
project are realised or clearly become unattainable.158
This would commit prospective controllers against
empire building and similar conflicts of interest.
This reasoning reveals that the combination of a 1S1V
default with a MOM rule for altering it provides an
advantage that loyalty shares only have in theory: the
temporary character of control enhancement.159 It is
often argued that because loyalty shares confer benefits
depending on a holding period, eventually there will be
no disproportionality between ownership and voting
rights among loyal shareholders. In practice, this never
leads to the elimination of control enhancement because,
as explained, institutional investors cannot commit to
the same loyalty as a controlling shareholder. On the
contrary, having to negotiate with institutional investors
the midstream introduction of dual-class shares, manag-
ers and dominant shareholders must likely commit to
sunsetting disproportional voting structures.
A major disadvantage of dual-class shares and
entrenched control structures in general is that they are
difficult to remove once they are established. This may
lead to inefficiency because the same company that once
benefited from entrenched control may suffer from it
later on. The need for controllers to offer investors a
sunset arrangement to enable a dual-class recapitalisa-
tion overcomes this problem. As the recent U.S. experi-
ence with the poison pill suggests, institutional investors
can be talked into accepting control enhancements only
when these are temporary.160 So if, within a limited
period, the entrepreneurial project succeeded, both con-
trolling and non-controlling shareholders would make
their profits and the dual-class structure could be col-
lapsed. If, instead, the project failed, the expiration of
the dual-class structure would make it easier to reallo-
cate control of the company’s assets, with or without the
intervention of activists or hostile bidders. Therefore,
the sticky default approach to 1S1V proposed here sup-
ports not only the selection of voice restrictions by the
companies for which this is efficient ex-ante, but also
the removal of these restrictions when they become inef-
ficient ex post.
158. On the theoretical advantages of such sunset clauses, see L.A. Bebchuk,
‘Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements’, 152 University of
Pennsylvania Law Review 713 (2003). For an application to the take-
over context, see Enriques and others, above n. 32, at 126.
159. Dallas and Barry, above n. 138, claim the temporary character of the
disparity between classes of shareholders and argue, on this basis, that
loyalty shares are intermediate between dual-class shares and 1S1V.
160. See Gilson and Gordon, above n. 16, at 910-11.
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5 Conclusion
In this article, I have discussed the policy responses to
hedge funds activism in corporate governance. The
analysis has been based on Hirschman’s classic, Exit,
Voice and Loyalty. Although Hirschman wrote before
the re-concentration of ownership in the hands of insti-
tutional investors, which nurtured entrepreneurial acti-
vism by hedge funds, his framework can be adapted to
the new situation. Contrary to the received wisdom,
hedge funds do not pose problems of loyalty because the
arbiters of their activism are typically quasi-indexers,
which cannot exit strategically. What we can still learn
from Hirschman, though, is that voice can be excessive
for a particular company.
From this perspective, I have discussed hedge funds
activism both empirically and in theory. This analysis
reveals that, while the claim that the gains from hedge
funds activism are short-lived is not borne out by the
empirical evidence, the latter can tell us neither whether
the existence of hedge funds activism leads to short-
termism in corporate governance nor whether this is
efficient across the board. The real issue with activism is
a conflict of entrepreneurship, namely a conflict
between two views about the right time horizon for the
target company to maximise uncertain profit – the view
of the activist as opposed to the view of the incumbent
management. Leaving the choice between these views to
institutional investors is not efficient for every company
at every point in time.
In order to cope with this problem, this article has
argued that regulation should refrain from curbing the
power of activists. Rather, regulation should enable
individual companies to limit the impact of activism
when this is efficient for them. Reviewing the recent
European experience with loyalty shares, this article
contends that they operate as dual-class shares in dis-
guise, sometimes allowing their midstream introduction
without the approval by institutional investors. It is
preferable for efficiency to allow dual-class recapitalisa-
tions explicitly, subject to a majority of minority vote
conferring an effective veto power upon institutional
investors. This ‘sticky default’ solution would screen the
companies for which limiting the influence of activists is
efficient, and induce these companies to negotiate time-
bound restrictions (for instance, sunset clauses) with
institutional investors.
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